Accountability beyond the initial decision.

A sound process identifies who prepares the analysis, who challenges it, who is authorised to decide and who is responsible for the follow-up. Material conditions should be closed before execution or escalated to the authorised decision-maker.

A change in price, ownership, rights or a material assumption should prompt a reassessment—not disappear into the execution process.

The current portfolio model proposes a $1.5m total cost-exposure ceiling per company, including initial and follow-on investments—7.5% of the $20m target fund. This is a proposed allocation discipline, not an adopted mandate or a promise to invest that amount in every company.

Founder communities, professional services and investment relationships can overlap. Our proposed process records the relationship, the potential conflict, any related fees or economic interest, and the measures required to address it.

Providing or receiving professional services should not be presented as securing funding. Membership of a community should not imply preferential investment treatment. Referral arrangements and allocations need their own scrutiny.

The proposed monitoring record would connect the original investment case to a small set of meaningful measures:

• Customer evidence: repeat usage, retention, customer concentration and material changes in purchasing behaviour.
• Revenue and delivery economics: recurring and non-recurring revenue, margins after relevant delivery costs and significant contractual commitments.
• Liquidity: cash, net burn, runway and the funding required to reach the next milestone.
• Capital and ownership: cap-table changes, financing terms, dilution, security rights and follow-on needs.
• Execution and governance: progress against agreed milestones, key hires or departures, IP and data issues, security incidents and material disputes.

Each measure needs a definition, reporting period, source and explanation of limitations. An estimate should not be presented with the same confidence as reconciled financial information.

A later financing can provide useful evidence, but its headline company valuation may not describe the value of the security held. Rights, preferences, dilution, transaction conditions and the quality of information all matter.

Our proposed valuation discipline distinguishes realised proceeds from unrealised estimates, identifies stale data and records the reasons for changes. Where information is incomplete, that uncertainty belongs in the reporting.

An existing holding should not receive further capital simply because it is familiar. The review should consider progress against the thesis, current price and rights, available reserves, concentration and the consequences of investing—or declining to invest.

A follow-on decision can be different from the original decision because both the business and the portfolio have changed.

Our fund-design model allocates $6m to follow-on reserves, equivalent to 30% of the $20m target fund. The reserve is intended to preserve capacity for evidence-led decisions after the first investment; it is not cash already held, committed follow-on funding or an entitlement for portfolio companies.

The current fund-design scenario proposes a $200,000 manager investment, equivalent to 1% of the $20m target fund. This is a proposed commitment for discussion, not an amount already funded or a legally binding undertaking. Alignment also depends on transparent fees, conflicts and decision-making—not a percentage alone.

Alignment belongs beside allocation. The planning model includes a $200,000 manager investment—1% of the target fund size—subject to confirmation and funding. An agreed mandate, transparent responsibilities and reporting that distinguishes operating progress from realised returns are equally important.

We intend to provide quarterly LP updates—four reporting periods in a full year—targeting delivery within 45 days of each quarter-end. The final timetable remains subject to governing documents, valuation work and administrator requirements.

Each update should reconcile cash movements, holdings and valuations and explain material developments, risk concentrations, conflicts and changes in the investment thesis.

Performance measures, when there is an actual record to report, must state their period, valuation basis and whether they are gross or net of fees and expenses. Community activity, advisory revenue and unrealised company valuations are not substitutes for fund performance.

Access to community or professional-services information does not automatically authorise its use by an investment business. Information should have a clear purpose, be shared with permission where required and remain limited to the people who need it.

The intended investor process separates a general enquiry from qualification and access to confidential material. Sensitive documents should not be submitted through an open website form.

What does the fund own? What capital has been called, invested, reserved and distributed? Which milestones have changed? What supports each valuation? What fees, expenses and related-party matters need attention? What decisions follow from the evidence?

The final governing documents will determine the reporting timetable and investor rights. No audit arrangement, withdrawal right or liquidity window is promised here.

Venture investments may remain illiquid for long periods. Companies may fail, further financing may be unavailable, ownership may be diluted and investors may lose all invested capital.

AI businesses also face uncertainty around technical reliability, IP and data access, supplier dependence, customer adoption and changing requirements. Careful assessment does not eliminate those risks or guarantee returns.

Westminster’s proposed investment business, related professional-services activities and AI Founders Connect should be described according to their separate roles. Personal qualifications, university venues and community relationships do not establish a fund’s regulatory permissions or imply third-party endorsement.

The intended manager/adviser is Alderwick & Co. LLC, an existing New York company and the operator of the New York-based Westminster investment business. Alderwick Fund I GP LLC is the proposed Delaware general partner and Alderwick Fund I LP is the proposed Delaware investment fund. The names are selected, using Roman I; GP/fund formation, appointments, service-provider responsibilities, permissions and applicable disclosures must be settled before launch.

Discuss governance and operating arrangements · Read our investment approach